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THE EFFECTS OF FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION
ACCOUNTING ORDERS ON DIVIDEND LEGALITY
DONALD SCHAPIRO-
ACCOUNTING reform has become a prominent feature of public
utility regulation.' The Federal Power Commission, probably the
acknowledged leader of enforced "accounting reform," recently stated:
"The importance of proper accounting in connection with the
Federal Power Commission's regulatory work cannot be over-
emphasized. Accounting may be said to be the backbone of utility
regulation." 2
In an attempt to achieve "proper accounting" the FPC has prescribed a
uniform system of accounts for public utilities and licensees subject
to its jurisdiction. 3 Imposition of this system has led to enforced re-
duction in balance sheet values of utility properties.
The direct result of such reductions is reflected only in the utility's
financial statements. 4 Indirectly, however, balance sheet write-downs
and administrative findings supporting them may have far-reaching
substantive effects. For instance, they may adversely affect the rate
base or decrease the depreciation recoverable as an operating expense,
impair a company's ability to market securities 5 or obtain other
credit, cause a decline in the value of outstanding securities, give rise
to tax consequences, or restrict dividend payments. All of these
possible ramifications merit careful study. This Article, however, is
t31ember of the New York Bar. Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School.
1. Towsley, Book Review, 49 CoL L. REV. 147, 149 (1949) suggests that regulation
of accounting has in fact given way to regulation by accounting.
2. 26 FPC ANN. REP. 39 (1946).
3. FPC, Uuwoimu SYsmar OF AccouTrrs Pasc mD FOR PUBLIC U nrs MM
Licasrsaa SuJEr TO THE PRovIsIONs OF THm Fmuta. Po\vER Acr, EFFEcIvE JA 2UA Y
3, 1937 (1936). See 12 FED. REG. 8503 et seq. (1947) for reprint incorporating later
changes.
4. It is generally conceded that scribbles, unlike earthquakes or fires, do not cause
a physical change in utility properties; nor can the enforced restatement of asset values
be observed by the most delicate engineering instruments.
5. For e-ample, FPC write-downs may affect the legality of utility stock for life
insurance investment. See, generally, Comment, Statutory Reoulation of Life Insurance
Investment, 57 Ys.il LJ. 1256 (1948).
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limited to problems arising out of the effect of FPC accounting orders
on dividend legality.
The Federal Power Act, the Public Utilities Holding Company Act 0
and many state statutes I require, in effect, that permissible dividends
be measured by surplus, i.e., an amount equal to the total assets minus
the sum of the liabilities and legal capital. Where one of these statutes
is applicable, a write-off of asset values with no concomitant reduction
in liabilities or capital stock, i.e., a write-off against surplus, would
reduce legally permissible dividends. FPC accounting orders often
call for a revaluation of assets in this way. Since there is no logical
bar to valuing assets by one method for FPC accounting purposes and
by a different method for a determination of dividend legality, the
issue is sharply presented as to whether the assets and surplus as re-
duced by the FPC, rather than the former higher values, will be taken
as the dividend yardstick.
SU~IMA.R OF FPC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE
The Federal Power Commission's jurisdiction over accounting stems
from Section 301 of the Federal Power Act 8 which provides that:
"Every licensee and public utility shall . . . keep . . .such
accounts .. . as the Commission may . . . prescribe. . . . Pro-
vided, however, that nothing in this act shall relieve any public
utility from keeping any accounts ...which .. .may be re-
quired ...under authority of the laws of any State. The Com-
mission may prescribe a system of accounts to be kept by licensees
and public utilities and may classify such licensees and public
utilities and prescribe a system of accounts for each class. The
Commission, after notice and opportunity for hearing, may deter-
mine by order the accounts in which particular outlays and receipts
shall be entered, charged, or credited."
6. Federal Power Act of 1935, § 305, 49 STAT. 856 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 825d (1946)
and Public Utility Holding Company Act, § 12(c), 49 STAT. 823 (1935), 15 U.S.C.
§ 791(c) (1946). The former applies only to public utilities, licensees being specifically
omitted. (See notes 9 and 10 infra). See H. R. RaP. No. 1903, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 75
(1934). The latter encompasses utilities subject to the Holding Company Act. It is
important to give § 305 of the Power Act operational significance because as § 11 pro-
ceedings under the Holding Company Act go forward, the SEC loses jurisdiction over
many operating utilities. 13 SEC ANN. REP. 88 (1947) ; 27 FPC ANN. REP. 10 (1947).
7. It would seem to make little difference whether or not the federal and state law
are identical, since dividend payments would presumably be restricted by the most
stringent statute.
8. Part I of the Power Act was amended and Parts II and III added by Title II
of the Public Utility Act of 1935, of which Title I is the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act. Under these statutes the FPC and SEC administer a comprehensive scheme
of federal regulation over certain utility holding and operating companies.
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For utilities also subject.to the jurisdiction of the Securities Exchange
Commission under the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, Sec-
tion 301 has become operative only by virtue of Rule U-27 promul-
gated by the SEC. Section 318 of the Power Act provides that in case
of joint jurisdiction of the SEC and FPC with respect to the method of
keeping accounts, the SEC's jurisdiction, if exercised, is superior. By
Rule U-27, the SEC has specifically exempted utilities from its own
accounting jurisdiction where accounts are prescribed by the FPC or a
state agency.
Pursuant to the authority thus granted, the FPC has prescribed for
both licensees 9 and utilities 10 a uniform system of accounts. The
noteworthy and most widely commented on feature of this system is
its incorporation of the "original cost" concept of valuation,1 which
dictates, in general, that utilities should be permitted to show assets
at no higher a dollar figure than the original cost to the first person
9. Part I of the Power Act relates to licensees including persons, municipalities
and states required by § 23 to secure a license from the FPC. This encompasses, broadly
speaking, hydroelectric generators on navigable interstate waterw-ays or power developed
on public lands and reservations. By § 4 the FPC is empowered to determine the "actual
legitimate original cost of and the net investment in a licensed project." Net invest-
ment, defined in § 3(13), is more than a bookkeeping concept and is geared to operative
provisions of the Act: It furnishes the basis for recapture price should the United
States at the expiration of the license period exercise the right granted by § 14; it pro-
vides the basis under §10(d) for the computation of excess earnings, a specified portion
of which after 20 years of operation must be set aside in amortization reserves which in
effect represent the government's equity in the licensed project; net investment by §20
is the criterion for rate regulation subject to FPC jurisdiction.
In matters of rate regulation the FPC is subsidiary to state agencies: By § 19 in-
trastate rates may be fixed only when and so long as there is no local regulatory agency.
Interstate rates are subject to FPC jurisdiction as provided in § 20 only when the state
or states concerned have no regulatory agency or are unable to agree on rates through
their properly constituted authority. Sections 19 and 20 refer to licensees, and FPC
rate jurisdiction is e-panded in Parts II and III of the Power Act which are concerned
with licensees and "public utilities" as therein defined.
10. Part II of the Power Act relates to public utilities. Section 201(e) defines a
public utility to mean any person except a governmental unit, who owns or operates
facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the FPC under Part II. This jurisdiction e.-
tends to transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and sale of electric energy
at wholesale in interstate commerce. The Commission has power to set rates for sales
of electricity within its jurisdiction, i.e., sales at wholesale in interstate commerce. In
addition the FPC may ascertain the "actual legitimate cost" of the property of every
public utility. However, the pattern of federal regulation is in many ways subordinate
to that of the states, as is explained in § 201 (a) and illustrated by provisions giving the
FPC jurisdiction over security issues only where there is no appropriate state agency.
11. The best and most dispassionate commentary is Kripke, A Case Study in the
Relationship of Law and Accounting: Uniform Accounts 100. and 107, 57 HAvm. L. Rn'.
433. 693 (1944).
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devoting the property to public service. 12 .The difference between
(1) what the accounting utility paid, or the par value of securities it
issued for the asset and (2) original cost 13 is held to be an "inflation"
or "intangible" and written-off.
In accommodating to the original cost concept, the FPC system uses
chiefly three specialized accounts. Account 100.1, Electric Plant in
Service, shows the original cost of electric plant. 14 Account 100.5,
Electric Plant Acquisition Adjustments, shows, generally speaking,
the amounts by which arms-length purchase price exceeded original
cost. Account 107, Electric Plant Adjustments, is reserved for more
illegitimate items representing a write-up or inflation. Together ac-
counts 100.5 and 107 reflect the excess over original cost. While the
line betveen these accounts may be shadowy, 1 a simple example may
illustrate the distinction between the two accounts. Assume Parent
Company in an arms-length transaction paid Vendee Utility $800,000
for property which originally cost Vendor $700,000 at the time of its
dedication to public service. Parent subsequently transfers the prop-
erty to Operating Subsidiary in exchange for securities with a par value
of $1,000,000, and the property is carried on Operating Subsidiary's
books at $1,000,000. In a reclassification of Subsidiary's Accounts
the original cost of the property (Account 100.1) would appear as
$700,000; Account 100.5 would show $100,000 and Account 107 would
carry $200,000.
Amortization policy with respect to adjustment accounts 100.5 and
107 is reported by the FPC to be as follows:
"Amounts classified ... [in Account 100.5] may be disposed
of by the companies through charges to earned surplus, or amor-
tized over a reasonable period of years ... to income. Amortiza-
tion periods prescribed by the Commission have varied from one
to fifteen years depending upon the fact of each case. Amortization
charges are usually made to Account 537, Miscellaneous Amortiza-
tion, although in a few instances Account 271, Earned Surplus, has
been used upon the request of utilities. The disposition of write-
12. In view of the clear statutory mandate and the well settled line of cases uphold-
ing prescribed uniform accounting for utilities, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United
States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. United States, 287 U.S. 134
(1932), the Supreme Court had little difficulty sustaining the FPC accounting system, as
such, Northwestern Electric Co. v. FPC, 321 U.S. 119 (1944), particularly since the doc-
trine of original cost as an accounting concept had received express judicial sanction in the
American Telephone & Telegraph case.
13. Critics of "original" cost often term it "aboriginal" cost. See, e.g., NAsn, Tun
ANAToMY oF DEPREciATioN (1947).
14. Several other accounts also show original cost, but, for present purposes, are
neglected.
15. See Kripke, srnpra note 11, at 693-703.
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ups, etc., called electric plant adjustments [Account 107], has
largely been affected by charges to earned or capital surplus." 10
The FPC uniform system has been in operation for over a decade.
Of the 195 reports examined by the FPC up to April 30, 1948, the
amounts classified in Accounts 100.5 and 107 represented 21% of total
utility plant and 27% over its original cost. Of the excess over original
cost, the FPC classified two-thirds to Account 107 and the remainder
to Account 100.5.17 Thus under FPC accounting orders, more than
20% of former book carrying values of utility plants have been %written-
off against surplus. Furthermore, there are indications that the FPC
will next focus attention on the utilities' depreciation policies,'8 and
it is not unlikely that the equivalent of further write-downs will occur
where depreciation reserves are found to be inadequate.
AssET WRITEDOWNS AND DImEND LEGALITY
The Decisional Law
The most authoritative pronouncement to date relating to the effect
of FPC ordered write-offs on dividend legality is in NorIhwestern Elec-
tric Company v. FPC.19 Shortly after its organization under Washing-
ton law in 1911, Northwestern issued all of its $10,000,000 par value
common stock to its promoters, charging "Land and Water Rights"
and crediting "Common Capital Stock" on its books for $10,000,000.
In 1925 the American Power & Light Company purchased all of North-
western's outstanding common stock for $5,000,000. A year later
Northwestern's assets were restated to reflect their purported fair
value. A write-off of $6,500,000 was made against reduction surplus
arising when the par value of common stock was reduced from $10,000,-
000 to $3,500,000.20
In 1935 Northwestern became subject to FPC jurisdiction and was
required to conform its accounts to the prescribed uniform system.
The FPC had little difficulty finding a $3,500,000 write-up on North-
western's books representing the unwritten-off portion of the $10,000,-
16. 27 FPC ANN. REP. 82 (1947).
17. MOODY'S PUBLIc UTLrrIEs a-14 (1948).
18. Cf. MooDYs PUBLIC UTITiES a-14 (1947); 27 FPC Ari. Ru. 25 (1947).
19. 321 U.S. 119 (1944).
20. The restatement of Northwestern's assets was made pursuant to authority granted
by the regulatory agencies of Washington and Oregon. The Oregon regulatory agency
had not included any part of the $10,000,000 in Northwestern's rate base. Northwestern
Electric Co., 3 P.U.R. (N.S.) I (Oregon Public Utilities Comm'r 1934). In approving
the reduction of capital, the state regulatory agencies of both Oregon and Vashington
expressly stipulated that this was not recognition that the $3,500,000 represented value.
Transcript of Record pp. 580-1, Northwestern Electric Co. v. United States, 321 U.S.
119 (1944).
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000 which originally had been entered shortly after Northwestern's
organization. The $3,500,000 was ordered transferred to Account 107,
Electric Plant Adjustments. Amortization of Account 107 presented a
knotty problem: the entire common stock equity was only $4,500,000,
$3,500,000 of which represented par value stock and about $1,000,000
earned surplus. 21 At the time, $5,000,000 of preferred stock was out-
standing, and most of the surplus was restricted against preferred
dividend payments by a prior SEC order.22 Moreover, the FPC felt
that future dividend rights of the publicly-held preferred stock should
be protected. These considerations led to an amortization order which
required the company to apply its net income above preferred dividend
requirements to writing off the $3,500,000 in Account 107. The reasons
for this order are given in the following extracts from the FPC opinions:
"Considering all relevant factors, we find that it is in the interest
of consumers, investors, and the public to direct the disposition
of the $3,500,000 write-up by requiring the company to apply all
net income above preferred stock dividend requirements to the dis-
position of the $3,500,000 in Account 107. This disposition, assum-
ing adequate earnings, is the equivalent of obtaining ultimately
from the holders of common stock (the holding company) a con-
sideration of $3,500,000 worth of stock. Certainly dividends should
not be paid on the common stock until it has the equivalent of a
paid-in value." 23
On rehearing:
"We were cognizant of the fact that the preferred stockholders
had paid some $4,800,000 into the company (in contrast to the
common stockholders who had paid nothing into the company
for the common stock) and some means, if possible, should be found
to protect their interests. Our order, in effect, contemplates a
charge, or series of charges, to earned surplus over a period of years
in the future and thus avoids the creation of a present deficit." 24
The FPC ruling was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.2 5 Northwestern contended that the FPC order deprived its
common stockholder, American Power and Light Company, of divi-
dends, hence property, without due process of law. Since the North-
western common was not to receive dividends, it was inevitable that
its market price would decline. The court might have ignored this
argument, resting its decision on the ground that a stockholder is not
entitled to dividends until declared, and therefore loses no property
21. MOODY'S PUBLIC ULriES 1840 (1941).
22. In the Matter of Northwestern Electric Co., 6 S.E.C. 57 (1939).
23. Northwestern Electric Co., 36 P.U.R. (N.S.) 202, 218 (FPC 1940).
24. Northwestern Electric Co., 43 P.U.R. (N.S.) 148, 151 (FPC 1942).
25. Northwestern Electric Co. v. FPC, 134 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1943).
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by a dividend restriction. But the court chose to face the issue and
upheld the order on the ground that it was reasonable as an accounting
order per se, and could not be disturbed because of any indirect con-
sequences it might have .2 The court did not hold that the FPC order
necessarily operated to restrict corporate dividends. It would only
have this effect if state or federal regulatory authorities made FPC
accounting procedures controlling for the purpose of determining
dividend legality.
Northwestern had also attacked the legality of preferred stock
dividends, presumably for the purpose of discrediting the amortiza-
tion method adopted by the FPC. If the FPC was correct in its finding
that the $3,500,000 transferred to Account 107 was a write-up repre-
senting no value, argued Northwestern, then Northwestern's capital
was impaired since the aggregate of assets, excluding the $3,500,000,
was less than the liabilities and capital stock. Under Washington law,
which employs the capital impairment test, no dividend was permissi-
ble under these circumstances. Hence a preferred stock dividend could
not legally be paid,27 and the FPC's method was improper in so far as
it provided for a payment to preferred stockholders while Account 107
had a balance of $3,500,000.
The court ruled, however, that for purposes of the state dividend
statute the FPC accounts might not be controlling and it was possible
that assets might be taken at "fair value" (including the $3,500,000)
rather than "original cost" (excluding the $3,500,000). However, the
state courts might accept the FPC valuations without accepting the
FPC declaration that those valuations should not operate to restrict
preferred dividends. Then Northwestern would be precluded from
declaring such dividends. But unless the state took such a position the
FPC accounting determination and order had no effect on the legality
of the preferred stock dividend.
Northwestern appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the
order was in excess of the Commission's statutory power and in viola-
tion of the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. Its principal arguments
were:
(1) that the Commission was attempting to destroy substantive
rights through the dogmatic application of its accounting principles;
(2) that the order was substantially equivalent to a judgment against
the present owner of Northwestern's common stock upon an unpaid
stock subscription to a previous owner-a judicial question to be deter-
mined by the courts and laws of Washington. The determination of
26. This holding was based on the authority of Kansas City Ry. v. United States,
231 U.S. 423 (1913).
27. In spite of this contention, Northwestern had in fact continued to pay dividends
on preferred stock. MOODY'S PuBLIc Urnrr-s 156 (1945).
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rights among shareholders was beyond the FPC accounting jurisdic-
tion and rests with state law.
It also renewed its argument that the Commission's allowance of
preferred stock dividend payments tacitly recognized that North-
western's capital structure was not impaired.
It will be recalled that the FPC in its two opinions explained that
the factor leading to the adoption of the particular method of write-off
finally selected was the desire to protect the publicly-held preferred
while forcing the common, which had contributed nothing, to "pay in"
$3,500,000 before it would receive any dividends. In its briefs in the
Northwestern case, the FPC, perhaps with an eye on the court of ap-
peals decision, argued that the order did not pertain to dividends at all.
Contrast the above quoted excerpts from its two opinions with the fol-
lowing statements in its briefs:
"The corrective accounting prescribed by the Commission does
not alter the company's existing capitalization and is in no way
analogous to a corporate reorganization . . . [T]he order neither
requires nor prohibits the payment of dividends but merely pre-
scribes 'the accounts in which particular outlays and receipts
shall be entered, charged, or credited.' " 28
". .. [T]he order of the Power Commission did not purport to
control the payment or non-payment of dividends. ... 29
"Nothing in the Commission's orders directs whether or when
dividends shall be paid; they leave the way open for payment of
dividends if the company desires and is legally able to pay them." 10
"The order of the Commission . . . does not attempt to deter-
mine or affect the status of the stock under Washington law. Its
sole effect was to require that an item in the plant account found
to be fictitious should be charged to surplus." 3'
The FPC concluded:
"The Commission has addressed itself solely to the removal of
inflation from the plant accounts, a sound public utility accounting,
procedure, and what follows is merely one of the incidents [previ-
ously] noted by this court. .. ." 31
28. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Certiorari, p. 12.
29. Id. at 17.
30. Brief for Respondent, p. 61.
31. Id. at 66.
32. Id. at 72. Contrast Arkansas Power and Light Co., 80 P.U.R. (N.S.) 193, 209-17
(FPC 1949).
The American Institute of Accountants also filed a brief which took no position on
reversal or affirmance. It was directed solely at contesting the FPC assertion that the
method prescribed for amortization of Account 107 was in accordance with "sound ac-
counting principles." The Institute was concerned with the possibility of giving legal
sanction to an accounting procedure which was probably ill-adapted to general usage in
non-regulated industries.
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Faced with arguments that did not meet on the basic issues, the
Supreme Court in a unanimous decision upheld the order 13 but took
an uneasy middle ground. Justice Roberts limited the issue in the
case solely to the "question of proper accounting," 34 and affirmed the
Commission's authority to prescribe a uniform system of accounts for
public utilities. The method of write-off adopted was upheld as not
being arbitrary particularly since no alternative had been suggested
by the company.
The Court tersely dismissed Northwestern's arguments. It stated
that while the accounting method prescribed by the FPC interfered
with the functions of management to some extent, such interference
was "beside the point." 11 Whether the Court here recognized that the
FPC method of amortization would prevent payment of common
stock dividends, or whether it was referring merely to the fact that the
accounts must show "original cost" rather than "fair value" for pur-
poses disconnected with dividends, is not clear from the opinion.
The Court then stated that the FPC action in preventing the com-
pany from using fair valuation "takes nothing from the company or
its stockholders." 36 Again, the Court's statement is ambiguous. It is
impossible to tell whether the Court recognized that dividend restric-
tions must follow the FPC order but felt that the retained earnings
resulting therefrom would inure to the common's ultimate benefit, or
whether the Court meant that bookkeeping entries prescribed by the
FPC would not affect dividend payments at all.
Finally, said the Court, "We are not called upon to make any deci-
sions as to the ability of the company legally to declare and pay divi-
dends." 37 Again questions arise: Is reference here made to the legality
of preferred dividends? Or does the Court imply that common divi-
dends may be paid notwithstanding the order, thus vitiating North-
western's major objections as well as the moving purpose behind the
FPC's prescribed method of amortization? 31
33. Northwestern Electric Co. v. FPC, 321 U.S. 119 (1944).
34. Id. at 123.
35. Id. at 124.
36. Ibid.
37. 321 U.S. 119, 125.
38. The Court also stated: "Although if American had purchased the assets of North-
western it might have been allowed to place among its assets on its own books the actual
cost to it of the physical property to Northwestern, the fact is irrelevant upon the ques-
tion whether Northwestern may carry a fictitious asset account representing estimated
value of capital stock issued neither for money nor for property at exchange value."
321 U.S. 119, 124. One may agree that it is irrelevant as a matter of bookkeeping, but
surely it is questionable whether the form in which the transaction was cast should
control the substance of permissible dividend policy.
Further, said the Court, "Nothing in the statute or the order prevents Northwestern
keeping other accounts if it so desires which will give information with regard to esti-
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It is not surprising that the commentators have come to different
conclusions as to the substantive effect of the accounting order in the
Northwestern case. One commentator has interpreted the Supreme
Court's holding as an affirmation of the FPC's power to restrict divi-
dend payments through accounting orders." Another has remarked
that the case merely upholds "accounting requirements as a . . .
scheme of notation without substantive consequences." 4
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC,41 which followed the North-
western case, is of collateral importance. 42 The regulatory agency in-
volved was the SEC which assumed jurisdiction under the Public
Utilities Holding Company Act. The Florida Power and Light Com-
pany, conducting intrastate operations only, in a jurisdiction not
prescribing an accounting system, was required by Rule U-27 of the
SEC to adopt the FPC uniform system. Incompleted original cost
studies indicated that about $10,500,000 would be classifiable in Ac-
mated present appreciated value of its assets." Id. at 124-5. If Northwestern keeps
"other accounts," which set of books will control dividend payments under § 305a of the
Federal Power Act? Under § 12(c) of the Holding Company Act? Under state law?
Does it make any difference so long as dividends are not legal by any standard? Or
should books (as distinct from facts) control dividend payments? Do they? See pages
609-12 in!ra, and Arkansas Power and Light Co., supra note 32.
In connection with Northwestern's assumed freedom to keep other accounts it should
be noted that under the Holding Company Act (to which Northwestern is subject by
virtue of being a subsidiary of a registered holding company) the SEC has promulgated
Rule U-28 providing that: "No registered holding company or subsidiary company
thereof shall distribute to its security holders, or publish, any financial statements which
are inconsistent with the book accounts of such company or financial statements filed
with this Commission by, or on behalf of, such company." By Rule U-27, Northwestern
is required to conform to the FPC system.
39. "In the [Federal Power] Commission's brief [in the Northwestern case] the
method of disposition was presented as one which tempered sound accounting with mercy.
Here again, there was perhaps an illustration of the unresponsiveness of the legal mind
to accounting ideas. . . . The fact, immediately apparent to the accountant, is that the
order was more punitive than an immediate charge and, indeed, the most punitive that
could readily be conceived. Its effect was to prevent common-stock dividends being paid
until $3,500,000 of future surplus shall have been accumulated. An immediate charge
would have required the accumulation of no more than $2,500,000 of future surplus, since
there already existed a surplus of $1,000,000." May, Accounting in the Light of Recent
Supreme Court Decisions, 77 J. AcCOUNTAxcy 371, 372 (1944).
40. "Recent decisions like that in the Northwestern Electric case and the decisions
therein relied on, which uphold accounting requirements as a mere scheme of notation
without substantive consequences, might go far to remove these fears as to the financial
consequences of an order which was limited by its terms to accounting only." Kripke,
A Case Study in the Relationship of Law and Accounting, 57 HAIv. L. Ray. 433, 446
(1944).
41. 158 F.2d 771 (1st Cir. 1946).
42. Two circuit court cases following Northwestern affirmed FPC accounting orders
on the authority of Northwestern, but they throw no further light on the dividend Issue.
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count 100.5, pending a final determination as to disposition. The SEC
directed that $700,000 be appropriated annually from earned surplus
to a contingency reserve to provide for future amortization of Ac-
count 100.5. The SEC also directed that some $1,800,000 appearing in
Florida's surplus account, but really representing profits to affiliates,
be deducted from Florida's earned surplus.
Both parts of the order were appealed by American Power and Light
to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on the ground that as
holder of all Florida's common stock it was being denied dividends due
to the required write-offs of its subsidiary's surplus.4
In affirming the order the court gave three answers to the contention
Pacific Power and Light Co. v. FPC, 141 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1944); California Oregon
Power Co. v. FPC, 150 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1945).
Pacific Power and Light presented the question whether amortization could be di-
rected of an amount in Account 100.5. It was conceded by the Commission that the trans-
actions giving rise to the 100.5 balance was arms-length and the payments bona fide.
Accordingly it -was labelled "an intangible" rather than a mere "write-up.' Petitioner
sought unsuccessfully to distinguish NorthI-,estern on this ground. To the court, however,
the question was much the same: "The present case, like that involving the Northwestern
Electric Company, appears to us to present no more than a problem of proper account-
ing." 141 F.2d 602, 604. With this barrier hurdled, there was no difficult, in finding
the order within the permissible scope of commission discretion. Pacific's objection that
the elimination of intangibles from the "fundamental accounts" distorts its rate-base was
dismissed with the observation that this was not a proceeding for rate-making. Further-
more the order did not prohibit the utility from keeping the now familiar "other accounts"
to maintain a record of its intangibles.
The California Oregon Power Co. sought review of an FPC order directing the
utility to amortize over 10 years $800,000 includible in Account 100.5, and requiring a
charge to surplus of $600,000 representing profits to affiliates. The disposition of the
100.5 item was affirmed without discussion on the authority of Pacific Powr and Light
Co. In upholding the charge to surplus, the court analogized the licensee cases in which
similar elements had been disallowed as part of "actual legitimate original cost" with
concomitant accounting disposition. On the purpose and effect of FPC accounting orders
(in this case for a utility) we have the following statement:
"The purpose of directing the ascertainment of legitimate cost was not merely to
enable the Commission to compile and require the recording of informative data. The
aim was to eliminate the padding from utility accounts. The provision has the broad
purpose of protecting the public against artificially inflated investment costs on the basis
of which utility companies assert the right to a return." 150 F.2d 25, 27-8.
43. The SEC first contested American's right to review, asserting that a stockholder
is not a person aggrieved by an order restricting dividends. In American Power & Light
Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 250 (1st Cir. 1944), the petition for review vas dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction since it was held that Florida, not American, was the proper party to
contest the order. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed and held that American was
entitled to review an order depriving it of potential dividends. 325 U.S. 385 (1945).
The decision, however, is not strong authority for gaging the financial effect of account-
ing orders because the Court assumed, as did the briefs of both parties, that the order
did operate to restrict dividends.
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that the.freezing of earned surplus in the contingency reserve prevented
Florida from paying otherwise lawful dividends. First, said the court,
the company failed to suggest any alternative source on which to
draw for the contingency reserve. Second, prior years' dividends were
undoubtedly enhanced by a failure to record losses properly. Finally,
and somewhat ambiguously in view of the applicability of Section 12(c)
of the Holding Company Act to the Florida Power & Light Company,
the court said, "The state of Florida and not the SEC has jurisdiction
to decide what funds are available for dividends. . . ." 11
17(ith reference to the effect on dividends of the $1,800,000 write-off
of surplus the opinion contains a like disclaimer: "[W]e are not now
concerned with the legality of a dividend declaration. Northwestern
Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission. . ..
With the interpretation of Northwestern Electric Co. v. FPC as em-
bracing the proposition that even SEC accounting orders do not in
themselves determine dividend legality, the precise effect of prescribed
accounting on dividend legality remains uncertain. The cases lead
only to the conclusion that regulatory agencies may make original cost
valuations for "accounting" purposes. An "accounting" purpose, how-
ever, is defined only by exclusion! It is neither a rate-base determina-
tion nor a dividend order. An "accounting" order, the cases say, is
nothing more nor less than an "accounting" order.
The problem reconsidered
Since the question is unsettled as to what weight the FPC accounts
have with respect to the legality of dividends, it becomes relevant to
make an examination of some of the factors which should influence the
eventual resolution of the problem.
44. 158 F2d 771, 784.
45. 158 F.2d 771, 785.
The court also held that the SEC could adopt original cost accounting and that the
finding of probable inflation of $10,500,000 was sufficient to support an order directing
accumulation of a contingency reserve. American, echoing previous objections in FPC
cases, contended that in application to 100.5 items, original cost accounting was so con-
trary to "sound accounting principles" as to be arbitrary and capricious. After a review
of the accounting authorities, the court concluded: "Our analysis of the above authorities
leads us to the conclusion that the substance of the objections [to original cost] relates
to arbitrary dispositions of Account 100.5 regardless of value." 158 F.2d 771, 783.
Since, under the FPC stipulation in American Tel. & Tel. v. United States, 299 U.S.
232 (1936) (quoted in full in United States v. N.Y. Tel. & Tel. Co., 326 U.S. 638, 654
n.22 (1946)), which the court held binding on the SEC, arbitrary dispositions regardless
of value would not be made, it was reasoned that petitioner's objection lacked substance.
The opinion, however, does not attempt to give content to the words "arbitrary" and
"value."
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Can the Power Act be construed to give the FPC accounts
determinative weight in a dividend litigation?
There would seem to be ample statutory mandate for an affirmative
answer. 41 Section 301 of the Power Act gives the FPC jurisdiction to
prescribe uniform accounting. Section 309 grants the Commission
power to define accounting terms used in the Act. And under Sec-
tion 305 it is unlawful for an officer or director to "participate in the
making or paying of any dividend . . . from any funds properly in-
cludible in capital account." Moreover, one may argue by analogy
from Section 302 which permits the FPC to determine rates of de-
preciation: Since one of the functions of depreciation accounting is the
accumulation of funds, either liquid or otherwise, in advance of prop-
erty retirement, it is to be assumed that the FPC must have the power
to make this section operative by being able to restrict the distribution
of assets to shareholders. The power to prescribe accounts would be
relatively meaningless if the accountings prescribed were to have no
operational significance.
Could the conclusion logically be reached that the bookkeeping
surplus appearing on the FPC accounts is the yardstick
for permissible dividends?
Within the limits of usual valuation concepts, this question must be
answered in the negative. It will be remembered that in the North-
western case the utility argued that once the $3,500,000 in Account 107
was labelled inflation, even preferred stock dividends were illegalA7
The company's position was that either Account 107 represented value
for dividend purposes or it did not. If it did, then common dividends
would be lawful; if it did not then capital was impaired and all divi-
dends would be prohibited. In order to support what appears to be
the FPC conclusion that preferred dividends are permissible while
common dividends are not, one must say that Account 107 annually
lost value in amount represented by that year's earnings attributable
to the common. This conclusion seems difficult to justify by conven-
tional concepts, and actually boils down to the proposition that Ac-
count 107 has a value for dividend purposes just equal to its unamor-
tized balance for no reason other than that the books say so.
Another of the logical difficulties to be encountered in making FPC
bookkeeping surplus the dividend measure is illustrated by In re
Niagara Falls Power Company.4s Can a company be in a sound divi-
dend position at one moment and incapable of declaring a dividend
46. See Arkansas Power and Light Co., SO P.U.R. (N.S.) 193, 209-17 (FPC 1949).
47. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
48. SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4911 (Feb. 28, 1944).
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at the next, when only its book asset accounts-and not its physical
properties-have been altered?
Niagara Falls Power Company, a licensee under the Power Act, had
been directed by the FPC to eliminate about $15,000,000 from its
project account to reflect a determination of actual legitimate original
cost. 49 The $15,000,000 was to be written off against earned or capital
surplus. Niagara had an earned surplus of $5,000,000 but proposed to
create a capital reduction surplus 10 sufficient to absorb the entire
write-off, thus leaving earned surplus intact.
In its decision passing on the validity of this reduction, the SEC
stated:
"The significant factor is the impact of the reduction of capital
upon the right of the declarant to pay dividends both under State
law and the provisions of Section 12(c) of the Act. . . .But for
this reduction in common capital it would be necessary ... [to
retain] earnings and to use all the existing earned surplus before
payment of common dividends. . . This reduction, however,
frees all further earnings for common dividends in addition to the
existing earned surplus." 51
The declaration, however, was permitted to become effective be-
cause it was found not detrimental to the public interest.
The case is significant because of the SEC's flat assertion that, in
absence of the capital reduction, dividends would be illegal. Prior to
the FPC order and until 1942 Niagara had been paying regular divi-
dends on common stock. 12 The factor intervening between 1942 and
the SEC opinion was the FPC original cost determination and account-
ing order and this alone was deemed sufficient by the SEC to require a
reduction in capital in order to permit resumption of dividends. 3 If as
would appear to be true, the pre-1942 dividends were legal, we are
forced to conclude that an FPC investigation, original cost determina-
tion, and accounting order affect dividend legality as far as the SEC
is concerned. The physical properties remained unchanged; all that
occurred was a substitution in method of book valuation. Dividend
payment is presumably restricted the instant the FPC order becomes
binding.
4
49. Niagara Falls Power Co., 44 P.U.R. (N.S.) 291 (FPC 1942), aff'd, 137 F.2d 787
(2d Cir. 1943).
50. Par value of common stock to be reduced from $36 million to $21 million.
51. SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4911, pp. 5-6 (Feb. 28, 1944).
52. MOODY'S PUBLIC UTILInES 1321 (1946).
53. During the years 1943 and 1944 Niagara halted payment of dividends. Ibid.
54. While beyond the scope of this Article, it would seem that the SEC regards the
FPC-prescribed accounting as "sound" and apparently bases its financial conclusions on
it. See FPC Brief, Appendix D, Northwestern Electric Co. v. FPC, 321 U.S. 119, for
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Making shifting bases of valuation operative for dividend purposes
at the instant of shift, and not before, as was done in the Northwestern
and Niagara cases, can best be rationalized by holding that abookkeep-
ing surplus, per se, measures the maximum legal dividend. Such a
rationalization would have to be presumed on the theory that the
bookkeeping surplus is the corporation's public representation of its
dividend potential, and consequently the corporation is estopped from
asserting a right to pay more. Thus, creditors and other interested
parties may rely on a readily ascertainable figure. Consider, for exam-
ple, a New York corporation showing a bookkeeping deficit. Under
Randall v. Bailey,5 5 if it possesses assets whose value, including un-
realized appreciation, is sufficient to overcome the deficit, it may de-
clare a dividend. But it is not unreasonable to argue that in absence of
any bookkeeping adjustment to account for the appreciation, a divi-
dend should not be permissible. This contention would be based not
on grounds that it is inherently improper to increase a deficit by a
dividend, but rather by reasoning that even parties having knowledge
of the existing assets' values have a right to rely on the corporation's
representation that it will pay no dividends. In other words, the cor-
poration represents that it will retain a greater asset cushion than by
law it must. 6 This precise question has never arisen because in the
a letter to the Solicitor General from the Chairman of the SEC outlining SEC policy
with respect to FPC accounting.
55. 23 N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 20, 43 N.E2d 43 (1942)
holding that present asset values including unrealized appreciation may be used to measure
the fund for permissible dividend declarations.
56. The importance which may attach to public representations on financial state-
ments was graphically illustrated when the certified public accounting firm of Arthur
Andersen & Co. qualified their auditor's certificate in the E.L du Pont de Nemours &
Company 1943 Annual Report: "The company maintains a combined surplus, paid-in
surplus, and surplus arising from revaluation of assets. In our opinion the respective
amounts of these different classes of surplus should be stated separately.
"With the exception stated in the preceding paragraph, in our opinion, the accom-
panying consolidated balance-sheet and related statements of consolidated income and
surplus present fairly the financial position of E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company and
its wholly owned subsidiary companies at December 31, 1943, and the results of their
operations for the year ended that date, in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year." E.L DU PoNT
DE NEmouRs & COMPANY, 1943 ANNUAL REPoRT, p. 32. Reprinted in 77 J. AccouN;T:cy
333 (1941).
The 1943 du Pont report also contained a statement by the company's Committee
on Audit concerning the exception in Arthur Andersen's certificate with respect to the
surplus account. After reprinting the segregation proposed by the auditors and the rea-
sons advanced therefor, the Committee on Audit concludes, "[O]ur observation has been
that there does not exist sufficient uniformity or consistency of opinion among accountants
with respect to the definition of the several classes into which it is suggested that sur-
plus be divided or to the procedure which should be followed in the treatment of many
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normal course of unregulated enterprise, a corporation can easily
create a bookkeeping surplus by asset write-ups. The litigated cases
involve an attempt to show that an existing bookkeeping surplus was
in fact supported by asset values.5 7 In the case of public utilities whose
accounting is regulated, however, asset write-ups can be prevented
and the corporation prohibited from changing its representation. Thus
for dividend purposes, the "actual," "fair" or "real" value of assets
would become immaterial, and the utilities would then be held to their
enforced bookkeeping representations.
What would be the financial consequences of using original cost
for dividend purposes?
Making the FPC accounts and original cost valuations controlling
for dividend purposes would curtail permissible dividend payments
specific items to enable the company to make any segregation of the Surplus Account
which would not be subject to question as to its accuracy.
"The amounts allocated to the respective classes of surplus by Arthur Andersen & Co.
differed from those shown in a similar analysis attempted by another firm of independent
public accountants who a number of years ago examined the company's accounts and
certified to its financial statements.
"The committee on audit cannot accept the opinion of Arthur Andersen & Co. as
being conclusive for the reason that it believes that certain of the items comprising the
surplus account are not susceptible of such a segregation except on the basis of arbitrary
assumptions or interpretation, and that the company can have no assurance that at some
later date the accuracy of the segregation may not be questioned and if found inaccurate
the company might not be deemed to have published erroneous information which had
served to mislead the stockholders and the investing public.
"The company has been advised by counsel for years that, from the standpoint
of dividend payments, the law of Delaware recognizes no distinction either in the status
or in the availability of any separate parts of surplus. If in the future such a segregation
should be required by statute or ruling of some official body, no doubt such action would
be accompanied by such instructions as to procedure as will relieve the directors from
the responsibility of making an arbitrary segregation.
"The company has consistently maintained the practice of describing in its annual
reports the various changes in the surplus account as they occur, and we are of the
opinion that such practice discloses the material facts." E.I. DU PONT D; NEmouas & Com-
PANY, 1943 ANNUAL REPORT, pp. 34-5. Reprinted in 77 J. AccouNTAT;Cr 334 (1944).
The 1946 du Pont report was certified by a different auditing firm. Their certificate
reads in pertinent part: "The sources of surplus, as noted on the consolidated balance
sheet, are 'earned, paid-in and arising from revaluation of assets,' but it has not been the
practice of the Company to subdivide its surplus account. Lacking a definitive and au-
thoritative basis upon which to predicate retrospective allocations of the various charges
and credits which have been made to surplus since incorporation of the Company, we have
not derived separate balances for the respective classes of surplus as of December 31,
1946," E.I. DU PONT DE NEMaOURS & COMPANY, 1946 ANNUAL REPORT, p. 29.
57. E.g., Morris v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 63 A.2d 577 (Del. Ch. 1949);
Berks Broadcasting Co. v. Craumer, 356 Pa. 620, 52 A.2d 571 (1947). No case has been
found where a corporation did not have a bookkeeping surplus (or apparent current
earnings where permissible) at the time of a contested dividend.
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and require a greater common stock investment than would be the
case if conventional valuation techniques were employed. Restricting
dividend payment is, in effect, a devise for enforced corporate saving
and results in what is conventionally labelled a "sounder" or more
conservative capital structure. Stockholders supply more and creditors
less of the enterprise's business capital.
As a consequence of this shift, senior securities become safer since
there is a greater stock cushion to support them and absorb losses
that may occur. The junior security holders do not lose their eventual
claim to retained earnings since these earnings inure to the benefit of
the common stock equity. What stockholders do lose is the right to
withdraw funds, invest them elsewhere, and trade more heavily on the
senior securities' equity.
Forced saving also bears upon the utility's position vis-a-vis the
tax collector and rate-payer. A conservative financial structure with a
large stock equity and low interest charges is relatively undesirable
tax-wise, since bond interest is deductible in the federal income tax
computation.-" In unregulated enterprises the tax collector's share is
sliced only from stockholder earnings. For utilities, however, the case
is somewhat different since federal income taxes are normally con-
sidered an operating expense recoverable from consumers." Thus in
the case of utilities, the increased tax burden stemming from a con-
servative capital structure is shifted to the rate-payer.
Finally, where the SEC is conducting reorganization proceedings
under Section 11 of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, a large
common stock equity in an operating subsidiary is probably desirable,
since it fulfills the double purpose of protecting a subsidiary's bond-
holders while giving sound securities to senior claimants in the holding
company."
Have FPC accounting orders been open to a contest on the merits? That
is, have the utilities had an opportunity to litigate the
prescribed accounting?
Only a limited form of judicial review has been available to utilities
contesting FPC accounting orders. The test almost universally em-
58. INT. REv. CODE §23(b).
59. Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Georgia Ry. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 65, 632 (1923);
Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388, 399 (1922) ; Atlantic City Sewerage Co.
v. Board of Public Util. Comm'rs, 128 NJ.L. 359, 26 A.2d 71 (1942); cf. Detroit v.
Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 308 Mich. 706, 14 N.W.2d 734 (1944). See generally
Stockwell, How Public Utility Rates are Affected by Federal Wrar Taxes, 22 TA NS
535 (1944).
60. For SEC interpretation of financial effects of prescribed accounting see 10 SEC
AN.N. REP. 99, 103-4 (1944) ; 12 SEC ANN. REP. 78 (1946).
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ployed 61 is taken from American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v.
United States,62 wherein Justice Cardozo stated that in order to set
aside an accounting order "[w]hat has been ordered must appear to be
'so entirely at odds with fundamental principles of correct account-
ing' . . . as to be the expression of a whim rather than an exercise
of judgment." 63 When faced with conflicting expert testimony as to
what is the "proper" or "best" accounting practice,64 courts have
chosen the easy road of affirming the accounting orders as accounting
orders and nothing more. The FPC, in supporting its accounting
orders, has contended that they were "merely" matters of accounting,
and has thereby avoided detailed judicial review of those orders.
This is in sharp contrast with review proceedings of "actual legiti-
mate original cost!' determinations for licensees under Part I of the
Federal Power Act. Such determinations have been recognized as
having serious substantive consequences. For example, "actual legiti-
mate original cost" furnishes the basis of recapture price should the
United States at the expiration of the license period exercise its right
to recapture the licensee's equipment. In review proceedings of "actual
legitimate original cost" determinations, courts have been willing to
go beneath the various transactions and examine in detail the disputed
elements of cost,65 because they recognize the substantive consequences
61. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 326 U.S. 638, 655 (1946); Northwestern
Electric Co. v. FPC, 321 U.S. 119, 124 (1944); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC,
158 F.2d 771, 784 (1st Cir. 1946); Pacific Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 144 F.2d 602, 605
(9th Cir. 1945). New England Tel. & Tel. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 400, 412 (D.
Mass. 1943).
62. 299 U.S. 232 (1936).
63. 299 U.S. 232,236-7.
64. The unsatisfactory nature of the "good accounting" test is dramatically illus-
trated where two regulatory agencies holding a joint hearing and interpreting practically
identical accounting systems can come to differing conclusions as to what is "proper ac-
counting": Montana Power Company, 56 P.U.R. (N.S.) 193 (Montana Power Com-
mission 1944); same, 57 P.U.R. (N.S.) 193 (FPC 1945); same, 59 P.U.R. (N.S,) 58
(FPC 1945). See also the discussion of "accounting principles" in Arkansas Power
and Light, 55 P.U.R. (N.S.) 129 (Ark. Dep't. of Public Util. 1944). These cases
demonstrate that the motto experto credite is unavailing where the experts are at swords
point. Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly, the experts have launched caustic ad
hominem blasts at each other. See concurring opinion in Montana Power Co., 57
P.U.R. (N.S.) 193 (FPC 1945) answered in Dohr, Power Price Fixing, 80 J. Ac-
COUNTANCY 111 (1945). For a mature resolution of the current dispute among account-
ing profession and regulatory agencies see Kripke, supra note 11, at 720-7.
65. Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. v. FPC, 139 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1943) (costs
arising from transactions between affiliates; expenses of conforming to regulation);
Niagara Falls Power Co. v. FPC, 137 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1943) (corporate.merger as
creating an additional cost) ; Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 137 F.2d 701 (D.C.
Cir. 1943) (interest during construction; taxes during construction; contingent salaries) ;
Alabama Power Co. v. FPC, 134 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1943) (option payments; discounts;
excess land; bonuses to employees; fees to affiliates); Alabama Power Co. v. McNinch,
94 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (asserted increased cost arising from corporate merger).
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hinging on their decisions.6 In the accounting cases, however, the
FPC has been successfully playing the game of labels and tags.? This,
of course, does not deny that these accounting orders may be quite
justified and eminently sound. However, there would now seem to be a
serious question of whether it is fair play to hold these innocuously
styled accounting orders determinative in dividend litigation.
Conclusions
On balance and consideration of all of the factors outlined above,
it is the author's conclusion that for dividend purposes the FPC ac-
counts should be held determinative. The public interest in uniform
federal regulation of the financial activities of public utilities is suffi-
cient to outweigh the serious objection of almost unlimited FPC dis-
cretion which has resulted from the negligible standard of judicial
review. This judgment is premised on the consideration that the loss
to stockholders is actually not overwhelming since it only amounts to
forced reinvestment.
It should be pointed out, however, that utility rates are quite another
matter and should not be controlled by this decision with respect to
dividends. In this area FPC "original" cost accounting valuations
should be scrutinized carefully by the reviewing court. Considerations
of policy set forth in the now familiar Hope case C-.that rates be set
so as to yield a return which will cover operating expenses and main-
tain the financial integrity and credit position of the company-must
supplant adherence to "sound accounting." The FPC has asserted
that "original" cost figures appearing in the accounts should furnish
the basis for rate making. 69 This may or may not be true, but until the
66. See note 9 supra. A determination of "actual legitimate original cost" is a final
administrative order and failure to seek timely review precludes a later contest. Louisville
Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, 129 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1942). After findings of "actual legit-
imate original cost" have been made, licensees have objected without success to conform-
ing their accounts. Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, supra; Alabama Power Co.
v. FPC, 128 F2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Northern States Power Co. v. FPC, 118 F2d
141 (7th Cir. 1941). The "accounting" problem in the licensee cases is somewhat different
because the finding of "actual legitimate original cost" furnishes a satisfactory objective
basis for accounting valuations and the American Telephone and Telegraph test (see
notes 61-3 stipra) need not be employed. In the licensee cases prior to Northwestern Elec-
tric Co. v. FPC, circuit courts discussing the dividend question in dicta, however, came
to seemingly opposite conclusions. Louisville Gas and Electric Co. v. FPC, supra, suggests
strongly, and Alabama Power Co. v. FPC, mtpra, less strongly, that FPC "actual legitimate
original cost" valuations are conclusive for dividend purposes, while Alabama Power Co.
v. FPC, 134 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1943) deems them inconclusive.
67. See, e.g., notes 28-32 supra.
68. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
69. The cases are well reviewed in Blachly & Oatman, Actual Lcgitimatc Cost as a
Basis for Utility Regulation-The Experience of the Federal Power Commission, 36
GEo. L.J. 487 (1948) ; see also 27 FPC Axx. REP. 66 (1947).
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FPC is willing to litigate the accounting cases on this premise, there
are strong equitable reasons for not allowing an administrative agency
to do in two steps what it could not do in one. The only justification
for such a procedure in the context of dividend legality is that the
public interest 70 outweighs the relatively lesser loss to the share-
holders.
"OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS" AND DIVIDEND LEGALITY
After the Northwestern case and its progeny,71 it was apparent that
utilities were likely to have little success in contesting the merits of
FPC accounting orders. These cases made clear, too, that state juris-
diction over accounting would not oust FPC control. The courts also
emphasized that utilities could keep other accounts if they wished,
or if state law so required. But is there any virtue in having more than
one set of books? And if more than one set is kept which should be
controlling for the purpose of determining dividend legality?
Technically these questions are framed in terms of whether the
FPC has jurisdiction over the "official" as distinct from other or sup-
plementary corporate accounts. 72 The problem came to the fore in
the Northern States Power Company case.73 The company proposed ac-
counting adjustments to the FPC coupled, however, with the reserva-
tion that "the accounting entries to give effect thereto, are submitted
for the sole purpose of meeting the accounting requirements of Uni-
form System of Accounts prescribed by the Federal Power Commission
as interpreted by the Commission, without recognizing or admitting
the necessity or propriety of such accounting entries for any other
purposes whatsoever. . .. ," 71 The FPC approved the company's
70. The financial abuses of the holding company era are chronicled in the comprehen-
sive Federal Trade Commission report, SEx. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928),
and the Splawn Report, H.R. RE'. No. 827, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
71. California Oregon Power Co. v. FPC, 150 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1945) ; Pacific Power
& Light Co. v. FPC, 141 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1944) ; cf. United States v. New York Tel.
Co., 326 U.S. 638 (1946); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 158 F.2d 771 (1st
Cir. 1946).
72. The idea of "official" (or dominant, primary, and basic) corporate accounts is
not altogether new. New York Edison Co. v. Mialtbie, 244 App. Div. 685, 281 N.Y.S. 223
(1935), for example, alludes to accounts or memoranda disconnected from the books.
73. 64 P.U.R. (N.S.) 257 (FPC 1946).
74. Id. at 259, 260. The remainder of the reservation reads as follows:
"And such accounting entries, when made, shall not be construed as recognizing, ad-
mitting, effecting, affecting or establishing any value or values of the property of the com-
pany for rate making or any other purpose whatsoever, and are not regarded by the
company as in any manner changing or affecting the value or values of such property
as presently reflected on the books of the company or otherwise; and this reservation
includes but is not limited to the right of the company at any time thereafter to maintain
such Plant Acquisition Adjustments on its books of account for purposes other than the
accounting requirements of the Federal Power Commission and to include such Plant
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proposed adjustments but was firm in dealing with the reservation:
"The question which may arise by reason of the language used in
applicant's reservation is whether our accounting requirements con-
trol the fundamental or basic corporate books of account of a public
utility or licensee." 75 After reviewing the legislative history "- the
Commission concluded that the company "is required to reflect the
entries prescribed by our order herein on its fundamental corporate
books of account, and we will consider any failure to do so a violation
thereof." - The FPC thus asserted its control over the "official" books
of companies under its jurisdiction.
In Arkansas Power and Light Co. v. FPC 18 an unsuccessful attempt
was made by a utility to use the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act-"
Acquisition Adjustments in the property of the company for rate-making purposes or
otherwise."
75. Id. at 260.
76. The reasoning of the Commission in this regard is worth scrutinizing:
"A review of the legislative history of the Federal Power Act indicates clearly that
Congress was fully cognizant of the fact that uniform and comprehensive accounting
authority was not only desirable but a vital necessity to the effective regulation of electric
utilities. It took positive steps to correct the abuses resulting from deceptive and unsound
practices which were brought to light by the Federal Trade Commission's report on its
investigation of the public utility industry and to prevent their recurrence.
"If public utilities and licensees are permitted to reflect in their basic corporate
books of account entries at variance with those required under the Uniform System of
Accounts prescribed by this Commission, or our orders issued with respect thereto, the way
would be immediately opened for a return to the accounting abuses revealed by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission's investigation.
"Awareness of the foregoing fact caused Congress to provide that our accounting
authority be comprehensive and extend to the basic books of accounts of public utilities
and licensees. This authority is set forth specifically in § 301 of the Federal Power Act,
supra, and is supplemented by other provisions of the act, including § 302, 16 USCA § 825a,
which deals with the fixing of depredation rates and accounting for depredation, § 305,
16 USCA 825d, which prohibits the payment of dividends from funds includible in capital
account, and the provisions of § 203, 16 USCA § 824b, dealing with consolidations and
mergers. Frequently the most important question presented in consolidation and merger
proceedings relates to the possibility of introducing inflation in the plants accounts and the
capital structure, and this the Commission would be unable to prevent if the utility's basic
corporate accounts are not kept according to its orders. In other words, if the corporate
accounts in respect to the capital, surplus plant, and depredation in particular, are not
kept according to this Commission's requirements, important provisions of the Federal
Power Act will be rendered nullities.
"Of course, public utilities and licensees may keep such other supplementary and
memorandum accounts as well as subdivisions of the accounts prescribed in our uniform
system, as may be necessary or appropriate, provided that the integrity of our uniform
system, an essential element in the administration of the Federal Power Act, is not im-
paired!" Id. at 261.
77. Id. at 261-2. Accord, Arkansas Power and Light Co., 80 P.U.R. (N.S.) 193,
209-17 (FPC 1949).
78. 60 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1945) (complaint dismissed), re'd, 156 Ff2d 821
(D.C. Cir. 1946), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 330 U.S. 802 (1947), on remand, S0
P.U.R. (N.S.) 193 (FPC 1949).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 400 (1946).
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to determine where control of its "official" corporate accounts lay as
between the FPC and Arkansas Public Service Commission. Both
agencies asserted accounting jurisdiction and a conflict in "accounting
principles" was almost certain. The point was never litigated because
the case was finally decided on the ground that the company had not
exhausted its administrative remedy. The question of jurisdiction
over the "official" books, however, is not likely to be settled until it
receives judicial interpretation.
In assessing this problem, the first inquiry is whether the hallmark
"official" need be confined to any one set of corporate accounts. The
court of appeals 80 in the Arkansas case clearly supports an affirmative
answer:
"[A] public utility cannot keep more than one set of actual, offi-
cial corporate accounts. Neither can any other corporation, for
that matter. There must always be an official recording of figures to
represent the actualities of the business, to constitute the genuine
record of stewardship, the basis upon which representatives are
made as to the real results of the utility's operations and its true
financial condition in reports to stockholders and to the public, and
in financial statements to be submitted to prospective investors to
demonstrate its soundness, since any reasonable mind immediately
perceives that actual transactions can be truly reflected by only one
set of figures. A differing set shows only a hypothetical situation,
demonstrating the distinction between what is, and what might
have been." [emphasis added]."'
But this conclusion, no matter how dogmatically asserted, is not
persuasive. The recordation of business transactions is not analogous
to an engineering measurement. Were two observers independently
to place a yardstick against an object of fixed size, one reporting it to be
15 inches long, and the other finding it to be merely a foot in length,
there would be justification for concluding that one or both measure-
ments were in error. But when two accountants prepare statements
reporting a different figure for net income, there is no warrant for
holding that either is incorrect. This is true because while both may be
attempting to measure what is often referred to as "true economic
income," factors of judgment and choice among accounting conven-
tions may and often do lead to different results.8 2 Although it might
80. 156 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1946), rev'd per curiam on other groutnds, 330 U.S.
802 (1947).
81. 156 F.2d 821, 823.
82. For example, AmERICAN IN sTIUTE oF ACCOUNTS RESEARCn BULLETIN No. 29,
INVENTORY PRICING (July, 1947) states: "Cost for inventory purposes may be determined
under any one of several assumptions as to the flow of cost factors (such as 'first-in, first-
out', 'average', and 'last-in first-out') ; the major objective in selecting a method should
be to choose the one which, under the circumstances, most clearly reflects periodic income."
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be theoretically true that "actual transactions can be truly affected by
only one set of figures," there is no known way of determining this
(one set of figures." o
In view of this inability to reach a universally correct result, the
best that can be done is to select certain data for certain purposes.
There may be one computation of net income for tax purposes, another
for dividend purposes and still a third for a bonus calculation. Simi-
larly, asset valuations may differ depending on the purposes for which
they are used. In this way judgments may be made and accounting
conventions selected keeping in view the end to which the resultant
figures will be put.83 Such a process, disdained perhaps by the purist,
is not intellectually offensive and at the present stage of accounting
development is a practical necessity.8 4
Why then can the utilities not keep two or more sets of books, each
"official" in its own sphere? The FPC books could be kept as the FPC
directed and would be "official" for purposes of the Power Act. Any
books required by the state commissions would be kept as the states
required and be "official" for state regulatory purposes. This is ap-
proximately the current practice with respect to the Federal income
tax. No one doubts that the records of "basis," "I although often differ-
Selection of a different assumption as to cost flow would affect both balance sheet assets
and net income. The permissible methods of inventory valuation set forth in this
bulletin, it might be added, are not limited to these three nor is the area of judgment in
accounting confined to inventories. See, e.g., AccouNTAirrs' RANmoO0 751 cl seq.
(3d ed., Paton, 1945) (differing methods of depreciation accounting); id. at 730 ct
seq. (treatment of absolence); id. at 867 et seq. (going concern valuation); id. at
617 et seq. (accounting treatment of wasting assets) ; AmsnrucAN InsTrr= or Accouz;r-
ANTs RnsEARcH BuLLtnx No. 24, AccouNTING FOR INTANGmE Assuts (Dec., 1944).
83. MAY, FINANCL AccoUN=XG 3, 4 (1943) after listing ten distinguishable uses
of financial accounts goes on to say:
"General purpose accounts are not suitable in all of these cases; in some instances,
special purpose accounts are called for. This has become increasingly recognized in
respect of rate or price control and taxation, and it should also be recognized, for reasons
which will be indicated later, in respect of information for newv investors-or, in other
words, for the prospectus-and also in some cases for the determination of the legality of a
dividend. But even if these purposes are eliminated there remain at least'sL= which are
expected to be served by general purpose accounts.
"It is immediately apparent that any general purpose accounts cannot be expected
to serve all the purposes equally well-indeed, if they are to be appropriate for the major
use it is likely that they will not serve some other purposes even reasonably well. It be-
comes necessary to consider which are to be regarded as the controlling objectives, and
the possibility of changes therein.'
For stimulating discussion, consult Wienshienk, Accountants and the Law, 96 U. or
PA. L. REv. 48 (1947). This fact of course does not detract from the usefulness of pub-
lished reports. In non-regulated enterprises, particularly, the independent certifying auditor
will have the information available from which to prepare a report best suited to its
purpose.
84. See note 82 supra.
85. INT. REv. CoD, §§ 113, 114.
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ing from other valuations, are "official" for purposes of income tax
computations. Once the ghost of universal validity is disposed of, the
theoretical justification for insisting on one set of "official" accounts is
gone.
The serious practical objection is that public reports containing
multiple and contradictory financial statements are likely to be con-
fusing. 6 Such confusion, however, is not necessarily unhealthy inso-
far as it emphasizes that financial facts of a public utility subject to
joint state and federal regulation are indeed complex. Simplification
resulting from omission of important data is at least as undesirable
as the confusion stemming from a full disclosure. Furthermore, there
is precedent for the publication of multiple statements in that many
corporations include both individual and consolidated statements in
their annual reports to shareholders. s7
In the type situation illustrated by the Arkansas case the most
sensible compromise would be to draw the statements from one set
of books and use footnotes or similar devices to fill out the financial
picture. This has the advantage of providing all pertinent information
and calling attention to divergent accounting treatment where it
exists. Whether the utility has one or more "official" set of books then
becomes immaterial.
Recognition that there need be no one "official" set of books solves
only the verbal problem of the Arkansas and Northern States Power
cases. The basic issue within the context of dividend legality is not
whether the FPC should control the "official" corporate books, but
rather whether the accounts prescribed by the FPC should be "official"
for dividend purposes. Manufacturing a concept of "official" corporate
accounts is no more than a device for obtaining a judicial determination
of the hierarchy of inconsistent and competing accounting systems.
The one set of accounts securing preeminence is endowed with the
characteristic of representing the "true" financial situation, while the
other systems are relegated to being "merely supplementary" or
"memorandum." Within the limits of this reasoning, the legality of
all dividends would, perforce, be measured by the one "correct" set of
accounts. Should it be desired to remove utilities from the ambit of
FPC dividend regulation, Section 305 of the Power Act can effectively
be emasculated by employing the concept of "official" books while
86. The Montana Power Company, see note 64 mspra, shows dual records; its "cor-
porate" books conform to the Montana Power Commission system, while additional
records are kept in accordance with the FPC system. MooDY's PUBLIC UTILITIES 1170
(1947) reports both, giving prominence to the FPC accounts. The two systems show
different figures for net income and earned surplus for both 1945 and 1946.
87. See, e.g., Annual Reports to Stockholders of the following companies: American
Tel. & Tel. (1947); Standard Oil Co. (N.J.) (1947), Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y.
(1947).
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denying the FPC jurisdiction over those books. But if considerations
offpolicy favor federal regulation of utility dividends, one need say
only that the FPC accounts are "official" for all purposes of the Power
Act, including Section 305, as representing the facts of valuation and
income as found by the FPC.
Even if the FPC accounts are deemed "official" for purpose of divi-
dend legality, they should not be endowed with the quality of being
the exclusively "official" corporate accounts. To do so might give the
FPC accounts greater substantive weight than they merit in view of
the almost negligible judicial review that FPC accounting orders have
received. Moreover, the Power Act contemplates joint federal and
state regulation, and relegating state accounting systems to the role of
"memorandum" records is logically something less than joint jurisdic-
tion.
If this conclusion is adopted, we need decide only whether the pub-
lished financial statements should be prepared from the FPC books
with non-conforming explanatory data relegated to footnotes, or vice
versa. This is not a momentous decision but it would seem preferable
to construct the published statements themselves from the FPC books
mainly because of the advantage to be gained in national uniformity
and comparability.
